The Influence of Affect on Cognitive Breadth

Abstract

Affect plays a critical role in how broadly one processes and thinks about information. Breadth of cognition is shown to relate to, and be influenced by, affect that varies in valence (negative and positive), arousal (high/activated and low/deactivated) and motivational intensity (approach and withdrawal). While extensive work has shown support for the influence of affect on breadth of attention (attentional breadth), there is less research on affect and breadth of thought (conceptual breadth). The present dissertation investigates: 1) the relationship between various measures of conceptual breadth, 2) how individual differences in naturally occurring affect relate to conceptual breadth, 3) how anticipating and experiencing gains and losses influence conceptual breadth, 4) how differences in trait behavioral approach (BAS) and inhibition (BIS) relate to conceptual breadth in a monetary incentive paradigm, and 5) how individual differences in affect relate to filtering of irrelevant information. In Study 1, three varied conceptual breadth tasks appropriately estimated a conceptual breadth latent variable. Individual differences in naturally occurring affect were shown to relate to the common conceptual breadth variability where those who had low arousal positive affect showed greater conceptual breadth. In Study 2 conceptual breadth scores did not differ when anticipating gains and losses versus experiencing gains and losses. However, BAS, but not BIS, modulated the effect of large incentives on cognitive categorization where those low in BAS had higher conceptual breath following large losses and those high in BAS had larger conceptual breadth following large gains. In Study 3, individual differences in naturally occurring positive affect did not relate to the tendency to bind irrelevant and relevant information into memory (hyper-binding) in a meaningful way across four studies, However, hyper-binding was found in all studies including age groups where hyper-binding has not typically been shown before. Evidence from the current dissertation supports the significant role of affect in conceptual breadth, whether affect is naturally occurring or influenced by incentives, and provides evidence that individual differences in affect do not underlie individual differences in hyper-binding.